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SUMMARY
Congress continues to express concern
about a number of developments in Haiti,
especially the stalled democratic process there
and increased violence and human rights
violations.
Since the virtual withdrawal of U.S.
troops and the inauguration of Rene Preval as
President in February 1996, Congress has
been concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti
be effective and that Haitian leaders pursue
democratic reforms, including the holding of
free and fair elections, adopt sound economic
policies, improve security conditions in Haiti,
and fully investigate reported human rights
abuses.
Concern over political stability increased
as Haiti operated without a fully functioning
government.  An April 1997 election dispute
remained unresolved, the prime minister
resigned in June1997, and a successor could
not be agreed upon.  President Preval
dissolved the Haitian Parliament in January
1999 and ruled by decree after that. This
political paralysis also contributed to eco-
nomic stagnation, preventing major reforms
from being finalized and impeding access to
over $500 million in international assistance.
In July 1999, President Preval signed a
new electoral law that effectively annulled the
disputed April 1997 elections and called for
new legislative and local elections.  After
three postponements and international expres-
sions of concern about Haiti’s failure to set a
date, elections were held on May 21, 2000.
But the tabulation of election results was
tainted by charges of electoral irregularities
noted by domestic and international observers.
The electoral council nonetheless affirmed
those results, which favored former President
Aristide’s Lavalas party.
Because of this controversy, the opposi-
tion boycotted the November 26, 2000
national elections, and international donors,
including the United States, withheld election
aid.  Aristide won the elections and was inau-
gurated on February 7, 2001.  President Aris-
tide has pledged to enact political, judicial,
and economic reforms.  Negotiations between
Lavalas and the opposition alliance Conver-
gence, mediated by the Organization of Amer-
ican States, have stalled.  
International organizations have been
increasingly concerned about Haiti’s inability
to resolve its impasse.  The U.N. Secretary
General withdrew the U.N. mission in Haiti in
February 2001 and issued reports expressing
concerns about the Haitians’ failure to find a
compromise and the current lawlessness and
fear of political violence.  In December 2002,
Caribbean heads of state expressed concern
over “continuing instability and the prospect
of a breakdown in the social order” in Haiti.
In 2002, the OAS passed two resolutions:
January’s established an OAS Mission in Haiti
and called on the Haitian government to
“restore a climate of security” that is necessary
for resuming negotiations.  The one passed on
September 4 strengthened the mission and
supported normalization of Haiti’s relations
with international financial institutions.
U.S. assistance to Haiti for  FY2000 was
$78 million; for FY2001, $72 million; the
estimate for FY2002 is  $30 million.  The
request for FY2003 is $47 million.  The
FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations
bill (P.L. 108-7) contains no conditions on aid
to Haiti. It allows Haiti to purchase defense
articles and services for the Haitian Coast
Guard, and provides “not less than$52.5 mil-




Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations (P.L. 108-7, signed into law February
20), allocating “not less than” $52.5 million in food aid program funds for Haiti and
eliminating the notification requirement on aid to Haiti. On January 31, President Bush
reported to Congress that Haiti continues to be a major transshipment point for illegal drugs
to the United States.  In its annual narcotics certification report, the Administration said Haiti
had “failed demonstrably” in 2002 to counter illicit narcotics trafficking but also credited the
government with putting into force a bilateral maritime counternarcotics interdiction
agreement and creating a financial intelligence unit.  The President waived sanctions so that
Haiti could continue to receive U.S. aid.  The international community has expressed deep
concern over increased violent demonstrations in recent months.  U.S. officials said the
United States is “particularly troubled by the violence and intimidation perpetrated by
government-backed ‘popular organizations’ and their allies....”  At a Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) summit on December 8, 14 Caribbean heads of state said they were deeply
concerned over “the continuing instability and the prospect of a breakdown in the social
order” in Haiti.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Congress has followed events in Haiti closely during this decade, but especially since
September 19, 1994, when about 20,000 U.S. military forces, under code name Operation
Uphold Democracy, entered Haiti as the lead force in a multi-national force to restore
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.  Aristide was first elected President in December 1990 in
elections that were considered democratic, and he took office in February 1991.  He was
overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, and lived in exile for 3 years until the
United States negotiated his return in October 1994.  During the last year of President
Aristide’s first 5-year term, elections were held.  Rene Preval was inaugurated as the new
President of Haiti on February 7, 1996, in Haiti’s first democratic transfer of power.   In
January 1999, Preval dissolved the legislature and ruled by decree for the rest of his term.
Having won questionable elections in November 2000, Aristide was inaugurated for his
second term as President on February 7, 2001.  As election disputes from 2000 remain
unresolved, political turmoil has increased, and human rights conditions worsened.
From Aristide to Preval and Back Again
The Haitian military regime agreed to relinquish power after 3 years of diplomatic
pressure and economic sanctions by the United States, and members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations (U.N.).  Faced with the imminent threat of
a U.S. invasion, they signed an agreement calling for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S.
troops, a legislatively approved  amnesty for the military, the resignation of the military
leadership, and the return of President Aristide.  Shortly after the initial entry of the
multinational forces, President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, and within
a few months, on March 31, 1995, the U.S.-led operation gave way to the U.N. peacekeeping
operation, called the U.N. Mission in Haiti or UNMIH.
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Following President Aristide’s return, Haiti took steps to hold democratic elections,
with substantial assistance from the United States and the international community.  Most
first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held on June 25, 1995.  Although
deadly violence, which marred past Haitian elections, did not occur, election observers
alleged that there were numerous irregularities, including ballot burning in some places.
Several rerun or runoff elections were held subsequently, from July to October, 1995.
Pro-Aristide candidates won a large share of the parliamentary and local government seats.
Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995.  The Haitian constitution prevented
Aristide from running for a second consecutive term.  Rene Preval, an Aristide supporter,
won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter turnout of only 28%, and with many
parties boycotting the election.
Rene Preval was inaugurated as President of Haiti on February 7, 1996.  Preval was
trained as an agronomist in Belgium in the late 1960s, and he lived and worked in the United
States in the early 1970s.  He returned to Haiti in the mid-1970s and worked for several
businesses, after which he opened a bakery in 1983.  With the fall of the Duvalier
dictatorship in 1986, Preval was active in several civic groups, particularly Respect for the
Constitution, and he also worked with Father Aristide’s Family Is Life orphanage.  In 1991,
he served as Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Aristide’s government, until Aristide
was overthrown.  In March 1993, he joined Aristide in Washington, D.C.  Preval returned
to Haiti in October 1994, and served as the director of the internationally-funded Economic
and Social Assistance Fund from March 1995 until he was elected President of the country.
As President, Preval launched his “Democratization by Capitalization” program to
privatize government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital.  Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws on September 25 and 26, 1996 allowing the release of $226
million in foreign aid through the International Monetary Fund.  Protests against the
associated austerity measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the
proposed economic austerity program was Aristide.  In January 1997 he formed a new party,
Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year 2000. Prime Minister Rosny
Smarth barely won a parliamentary no-confidence vote on March 26, but bowed to pressure
from opponents of the government’s unpopular economic reform and resigned on June 9. 
He cited the Electoral Council’s mishandling of the April elections as a reason for his
resignation, saying he did not want to be associated with fraud.  
By the end of 1997, Haiti’s failure to form a new government had already cost the
nation $162 million in assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, and tens of
millions from other sources.  On July 15, 1998, then President Preval nominated a prime
minister.  The nomination process was stalled for months, however, by bureaucratic
procedures.  On January 11, 1999, Preval declared that most of Parliament’s term had
expired, even though elections had not been held to replace them.  He then installed members
of his Cabinet and an electoral council by decree, and began ruling by decree.  He continued
to do so through the end of his term in February 2001.
In elections boycotted by most of the opposition, Aristide was elected president again
in November 2000.  He signed an agreement with outgoing President William J. Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms.  According to the White
House, no new promises were made by the United States. The Bush Administration accepted
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the reforms set forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make. 
Aristide took office again on February 7, 2001.
The dispute stemming from irregularities in the May 2000 elections remains unresolved.
At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders singled out Haiti as
a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked the Organization of
American States (OAS) to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis. The OAS has
been mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the opposition
alliance Convergence, but negotiations remain stymied. 
Tensions and violence in Haiti have increased dramatically since Aristide resumed
office.  Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party and the opposition
coalition Convergence have reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent revenge.  Human
Rights Watch said that while Aristide called for a peaceful response to a December 2001
attack on the National Palace, his supporters were allowed to commit “serious acts of
violence with apparent impunity.”  On January 15, 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed
Resolution 806 establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for the Haitian government
to do all it could to ensure a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and fair
elections, including prosecuting anyone found to be involved in the December violence.  On
July 2, the OAS released a report stating that the attack on the National Palace was not an
attempted coup, as the Aristide Adminstration had claimed, and that “[T]he political
opposition did not paraticipate in the planning or in the execution of the attack.”  It also said
that the government and Lavalas party officials armed militants who plundered and burned
the homes and offices of oppositions members after the palace attack.  
On September 4, invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS passed
Resolution 822.  This further strengthened the OAS mission to “support, monitor, and report
on implementation” of OAS resolutions pertaining to Haiti, and on commitments previously
made by the Haitian government, including strengthening democratic institutions, forming
a new Provisional Electoral Council, and developing and implementing a comprehensive
disarmament program. It also called for Haiti to proceed with elections in 2003.
Congressional Concerns
In the last few years, Congress has been concerned about a number of developments in
Haiti, with attention shifting from one area to another as the situation changed.  From 1991
to 1994, Congress expressed concern over the flow of Haitian refugees and ways to restore
the democratic process  to Haiti during the period of the military regime.  Later, following
the military action in September 1994, Congress was concerned with the cost and safety of
U.S. troops in Haiti, and the holding of democratic elections to select a new parliament and
a replacement for Aristide.  Following the inauguration of  President Preval in 1996,
Congress was concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti be effective.  Congress also expressed
concern that Haiti’s political stalemate stymied reform and economic development, and that
various election disputes be resolved in a transparent manner.  Since Aristide’s return to
office in February 2001, other ongoing concerns include  the improvement of  security and




Holding of Democratic Elections
After Aristide was restored to power in 1994, Congress was concerned that Haiti
continue to strengthen its transition to democracy, and in particular that it hold democratic
elections in 1995 in accordance with Haiti’s 1987 Constitution.  In keeping with the
arrangements for President Aristide’s return to power, Haiti pledged to hold democratic
elections, even though some of Aristide’s supporters argued that he was entitled to another
3 years because he was denied office for 3 years by the military coup.
The Clinton Administration spent $1.3 million in technical aid for the presidential
election, which was held on December 17, 1995.  Although deemed to be generally free and
fair by international observers, the turnout was only about 28% and many of the parties
boycotted the elections.  Rene Preval, President Aristide’s Prime Minister in 1991, received
89% of the vote, with Leon Jeune coming in a very distant second with 2.5%.  Preval was
inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996.
The low turnout and the lack of competition has raised questions about the adequacy
of the elections.  The official U.S. Presidential Delegation to the Haitian elections found the
election to be “another important achievement in establishing a fully functioning
democracy.”  The report on the election by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
observation group, however, while praising the fact that it was an election without violence,
expressed reservations about the election because it lacked adequate participation or
competition, key elements of a fully satisfactory democratic election.
Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies were held on April
6, 1997.  An assembly was elected in each of Haiti’s 565 communal sections — roughly
equivalent to U.S. towns or districts.  These are the smallest administrative unit in Haiti’s
governmental structure.  Communal sections are part of 133 communes, similar to U.S.
counties, which belong to nine departments, similar to U.S. states.  Each communal section
assembly will choose one member to represent them at the communal level on a municipal
assembly, which will in turn select a representative to serve on a departmental assembly.
Although these assemblies, collectively referred to as territorial assemblies, are mandated in
the 1987 constitution, this was the first time Haitians were able to vote for officials at this
local level.
Many observers expressed the same concerns they had during the presidential elections:
low turnout – estimated to be 5% – and numerous irregularities. The United States decreed
the first round elections free and fair, but the Organization of American States disagreed.  IRI
called the elections “another lost opportunity in Haiti’s democratic development,” citing the
extremely low turnout and the continued “breakdown in the ballot and result collection and
consolidation process.”  Partial Senate results were announced in early May:  two of the nine
Senate seats open were won by candidates of Famille Lavalas, former President Aristide’s
new party.  The top two candidates in the other seven races were to face each other in a
runoff election.
These runoff elections were indefinitely postponed by the Electoral Council on June 12,
amid widespread charges that it had manipulated the elections in favor of Aristide’s party.
Most political parties had planned to boycott the runoff elections.  The postponement
reportedly came after U.S. Ambassador William Swing told President Preval that the United
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States would not recognize the runoff elections unless the Electoral Council reheld elections
in areas where the boycotting parties claimed fraud had been committed in the April
elections.
Prime Minister Smarth said his resignation was due in part to the fraud he believes was
committed by the electoral council, to which he did not want to be party.  “I cannot justify
that abuse of power,” Smarth reportedly said.  “In our country, power is a sickness.” The
country was without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to name
a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy.  Preval named a new
electoral council by decree in early 1999.  After criticizing the council’s new electoral law,
Preval signed it on July 16, effectively annulling the April 1997 elections and seeming to
pave the way for a resolution to the country’s 2-year old crisis.
 The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections assistance.
The provisional electoral council’s tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible
voters, issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts on May 21.  Every elected position in the country
except for president and eight Senate seats, were on the ballot.  Contested in those elections
were the entire 83-seat lower house, 19 of the 27 seats in the upper house – including the two
seats won, but never occupied, by Famille Lavalas – 133 mayoral posts, and hundreds of
local consultative assemblies.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a deadlocked
government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree, a new Parliament
could be installed and international aid released.  Instead, the elections brought Haiti into
another crisis.  Both opposition parties and international observers have said the process used
to tabulate winning percentages was erroneous and gave Lavalas ten more first-round
victories than they should have had.  Increased political violence surrounded the vote,
including the arrests or murders of many opposition activists.  Elections council president
Leon Manus fled Haiti in fear of his life, reportedly saying he refused to give in to pressure
from President Preval to approve incorrect results giving Lavalas candidates 18 Senate seats;
Manus said Lavalas candidates won only eight seats and that the others should have faced
second-round runoffs.  Two other council members resigned.  The remaining council
members announced the disputed results as final. Despite domestic and international
objections, the remaining run-off elections were held July 30.
In September, thousands of protesters shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans
called for the resignation of the Lavalas-controlled legislature.  The OAS tried  to broker an
agreement between Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail.  Presidential elections were held
on November 26, 2000.  Because the Haitian government refused to address the contested
election results, the United States and other international donors withheld election assistance
and refused to send observers to the election, and opposition parties boycotted them.
Aristide won the election and took office on February 7, 2001.  His inauguration was
attended by few, if any, heads of state.  The United States was represented only by its
ambassador.
President Aristide pledged to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms,
including correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections.  Efforts to resolve the dispute
frustrated the international community.  In July 2001, in talks mediated by the OAS, the
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Aristide government and the opposition alliance Convergence agreed to hold new elections
for local and most parliamentary seats but could not agree on a schedule for those new
elections.  In July 2002  the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held as well,
although all the OAS member states recognize Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head of state,
and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000 elections “have never been the
subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas mandate.”  Negotiations have also been
interrupted repeatedly by episodes of violence. Another attempt in July 2002 by the OAS and
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to mediate further negotiations ended with the OAS
representative saying a new approach was needed.
The OAS passed Resolution 822 on September 4 that tried to break the political impasse
by recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral prerogatives.”  In other words, it
removed the obstacle of having to complete negotiations with the opposition before elections
can be held.  The resolution, a consensus resolution negotiated by member states and voted
for by Haiti, says legislative and local elections will be held in 2003, on a date to be set by
a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP).  An “autonomous, independent, credible and
neutral CEP” was to be established  by November 4, 2002.  Haiti failed to meet that deadline,
in part because the opposition alliance, the Democratic Convergence, refuses to name a
representative for the council until the government makes all reparations to opposition forces
it agreed to for damage done by government supporters in December 2001.
Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance
Congress has been concerned about the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance to
Haiti, despite recognition of the great needs of the poorest country in the hemisphere.  The
Clinton Administration provided approximately $100 million in foreign assistance to Haiti
each year from FY1996 - FY1999.  Aid decreased after that, with $78 million in FY2000,
and $72 million in FY2001.  The Bush Administration estimates FY2002 aid to be $30
million, and requested a modest increase to $47 million for FY2003.
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Haiti, FY1996-2000
(dollars in millions)
Program FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999(est.)
FY2000
(req.)
Development Assistance 14.116 24.346 0.900 — —
Econ. Support Funds (ESF) 45.263 53.547 65.052 73.500 70.000
P.L. 480 Food Assistance
Title I (loans) — — — — —
Title II (grants for  emergency/
humanitarian purposes)
29.275 12.535 34.908 25.579 26.432
Title III (grants) 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 —
Interntl. Narcotics Control — — — — —
Peace Corps 0.671 1.032 1.118 1.236 1.380
For. Military Financing Grants — — — — —
Interntl. Milit. Ed. Train. (IMET) 0.169 0.275 0.290 0.300 0.300
TOTAL 99.494 101.735 112.268 110.615 98.112
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of conditions
on this assistance over the years.  In the past, it has conditioned aid upon the holding of free
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and fair democratic elections, the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for
human rights abuses, and full cooperation in narcotics interdiction efforts.  Congress has also
required that all assistance be approved under special notification requirements, prohibiting
any funding to Haiti except through regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.  Acting under this provision, the House International Relations Committee
and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have at times placed holds on aid to Haiti.  
Congress placed conditions on aid to Haiti under variations of the Dole amendment in
the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills from 1996-1999.  The bills limited all foreign
aid to Haiti, except humanitarian and electoral assistance, unless there were progress in
investigations of extrajudicial and political killings, and other conditions.  The FY2000
foreign aid bill (see “Legislation” below) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to
Haiti, and required the president to regularly report to Congress on the Haitian government’s
progress in areas of concern to Congress. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for
FY2001 shifted conditions, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free
and fair elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. The only condition in FY2002 foreign aid
appropriations law (P.L. 107-115) required notification to Congress prior to provision of any
aid to Haiti.  The FY2003 foreign assistance appropriations bill (P.L. 108-7, Division E)
contains no conditions on aid to Haiti.
The FY2003 foreign aid bill continues to allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and
services for the Haitian Coast Guard, and provides for “not less than $52.5 million” in food
assistance program funds to be allocated to Haiti (Sec. 551).
H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002 and 2003 (passed by
the House May 16, 2001) would have authorized $6,000 to the Organization of American
States for each fiscal year to be appropriated only for the investigation and dissemination of
information on violations of freedom of expression by the government of Haiti. The Senate
version, passed on May 1, 2002, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, contained
no such provision, nor did the final version, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2003, which was signed into law (P.L 107-228) on September 30, 2002.
The Bush Administration says aid to the government will not be renewed until President
Aristide fulfills his promises of political, economic and judicial reforms.  U.S. assistance is
being provided through non-government organizations.  Supporters of this policy argue that
providing aid to the government would permit the government to avoid resolving its political
dispute and making other promised reforms.  They also argue that  hard economic reforms,
such as privatization of inefficient government enterprises,  not just foreign aid, are necessary
to revive the economy. They argue that not much progress was made in Haiti, when massive
assistance was provided earlier. They also note that assistance is still provided to Haiti for
basic programs in health, education, food security, and environmental projects, through non-
governmental organizations.
Critics argue that aid to the government is necessary to support the fragile democracy
in a time of severe need, and to prevent instability and massive migration from the island.
They stress that Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with annual per
capita income of only $225, and argue that withholding aid to the government is contributing
to the continuing deterioration in Haitians’ quality of life.  In a November 2001 letter to
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President Bush, the Congressional Black Caucus said that “it is wrong to impose an
inflexible policy which conditions US relations and aid, be it loans or grants, entirely on a
country’s political process.”  The Caucus called for a review of U.S. policy toward Haiti and
the removal of its “blockade” of aid to Haiti.
Other Foreign Assistance.  In addition to the former Clinton Administration and
the Bush Administration, representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank have criticized Haiti’s continued failure to resolve the political impasse under President
Aristide, despite extensive efforts on the part of the OAS and other international players.
Since 2000 other conditions have continued to grow worse as well. Human rights conditions
have deteriorated following President Aristide’s announcement of a “zero tolerance” policy
for “criminals.”  According to AID, the executive branch has moved steadily to consolidate
power at the expense of the judicial and legislative branches of government.  The
international community has responded by greatly reducing or eliminating assistance to Haiti.
Because of the questioned legitimacy of the spring and fall 2000 elections, the international
community initially withheld about $600 million in aid. Over a two year period, donor grants
to Haiti declined by over 50%, from $357 million in FY1999 to about $160 million in
FY2001.  During the same period, gross loan disbursements declined by over 66%.  The
World Bank closed its office in Haiti, primarily because of the government’s failure to
adhere to IMF targets.   Much of this international aid has expired or been redirected
elsewhere.  Most funding will have to be renegotiated even if the Haitian government
resolves the election dispute and carries out other promised reforms.  
The Inter-American Development Bank has six undisbursed loans to Haiti, totaling
about $199 million.  Although the loans were approved by the IDB between1996 and1998,
the Haitian parliament did not approve four of them until December 2000; two have still not
been ratified.  The Haitian government is seeking the release of the loans, but several issues
remain unresolved.  These include the question of the legitimacy of the parliament.
Furthermore, Haiti is in arrears with the IDB, precluding further disbursement of loans.  The
Haitian government also had not met conditions required by the loans prior to disbursement.
OAS Resolution 822, passed in September 2002, supports “normalization of economic
cooperation” between the Haitian government and the international financial institutions,
urging the parties “to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such
normalization.”  As of December 2002, the Haitian government still had not cleared its
arrears, nor signed an agreement with the IMF on a staff-monitored program, two steps
which would lead to normalization.
Haiti’s Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business
Congress has been concerned that Haiti follow sound economic practices and that U.S.
business play a role in Haiti’s economic recovery and development.  Haiti is the poorest
nation in the hemisphere; Haitian unemployment is as high as 80%. Haiti’s per capita income
is $250 – much less than one-tenth of the Latin American average, according to an August
1998 World Bank report, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction.  “The overwhelming
majority of the Haitian population are living in deplorable conditions of extreme poverty,”
says the report, pointing to a long history of political instability, corruption, misuse of public
funds, and lack of governance as a key factor in that poverty.
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U.S. and international lending institutions have urged Haiti to enact reforms to reduce
the role of government and to encourage domestic and foreign investment.  Privatization of
nine government-operated para-statal enterprises (electricity, telephone, seaports, airports,
two financial institutions, and cement, flour and vegetable oil factories) has been seen as a
key reform to reduce government expenditures and stimulate investment.  Other proposed
reforms funded by AID or other institutions were measures to strengthen budget and
monetary policy, to modernize the investment and commercial codes, and to improve
banking practices.  
Economic reform, and the flow of international assistance triggered by it, have been
uneven.  During Aristide’s first term, the Haitian parliament passed legislation guiding
economic policy reform, including privatization of the many inefficient state-run enterprises.
 The Agency for International Development (AID) and the international financial institutions
were then able to release most of the non-project assistance that had been on hold.  Funds
moved more slowly than originally intended, however, because the lack of expertise in the
Haitian government made the negotiating and carrying out of programs more difficult.
Furthermore, although President Aristide had agreed to privatize some of the government
enterprises, he backed off when political opposition arose.  This decision prompted the
resignation in October 1995 of his Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, and the suspension of
assistance by the international financial institutions.  
Former President Preval’s privatization of government enterprises drew public protests
against that and other aspects of economic reform.  Preval’s “Democratization by
Capitalization” program called for increasing agricultural production through the partial sale
of four state-run businesses:  Electricity of Haiti (EDH), the Telecommunications Service
(TELECO), the Minoteri (a flour mill), and the Haitian Cement Co.  The Haitian Parliament
passed President Preval’s privatization and administrative reform proposals on September
25 and 26, 1996, paving the way for the release of some $226 million in foreign aid through
the International Monetary Fund.  Prime Minister Rosny Smarth’s resignation in June 1997,
the failure to replace him for a year and a half, and Preval’s dissolution of parliament left
Haiti without a fully functioning government.  This caused further delays in the execution
of economic reforms, stymied the passage of important legislation, including annual budgets,
and again interrupted the delivery of international aid.  
The lack of infrastructure in Haiti, its political problems, rising insecurity, and extreme
poverty make for a poor investment climate.  Haiti’s political stalemate has inhibited both
public and private investment.
Security and Human Rights Concerns
Congress has been concerned with the security and human rights conditions within the
country.  In 1995, during his first term, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern
in which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses. Haiti,
with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim police force of
selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National
Police (HNP) force.  The level of reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged
assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during the de facto military regime.
Since the return to civilian rule in 1994, Haiti has made progress in the protection of human
rights, but the gains made are fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with
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impunity.  According to the Human Rights Watch 2002 World Report, “worsening human
rights conditions” marked President Aristide’s first year back in office.
Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills for 1996-1999 with
conditions on aid to Haiti under variations of the Dole amendment.  These bills limited all
foreign aid to Haiti, except humanitarian and electoral assistance, unless there were progress
in investigations of extrajudicial and political killings and other conditions.  The FY2000
foreign aid bill outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including developing
indigenous human rights monitoring capacity.  The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
for FY2001 reflected a shift in congressional concern, prohibiting aid to the Haitian
government until Haiti held free and fair elections to seat a new parliament and was fully
cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. Current law (P.L.
107-115) prohibits aid to Haiti except through regular notification procedures, but contains
no other conditions on aid.
Shortly after taking office in 1996, President Preval asked U.N. troops and police
monitors to remain in Haiti to maintain security.  The U.N. maintained a presence in Haiti
for another 5 years, shifting from peacekeeping forces to civilian forces charged with police
monitoring and some human rights monitoring duties.  Under pressure from China, however,
the size of the mission, and lengths of the extensions were diminished.  (China has
challenged the U.N. mission there because of Haiti’s ties with Taiwan, which China
considers to be a renegade province.)  The United Nations ended its mission in February
2001.  U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said the mission could not function in a “climate
of political turmoil.”
Annan’s report also said that Haiti’s police force is under-equipped, “demoralized and
unmotivated” and that Lavalas had “disregarded all calls for a rectification” of the May 2000
elections. On May 18, 2001, Annan released another report expressing “concern about
lawlessness and an ever-present fear of an outbreak of major political violence ...”  in Haiti.
He noted that Aristide had asked for a renewed U.N. mission but did not indicate whether
one would be provided.
Most observers agree that extensive reform of the judicial system is necessary to further
strengthen the state’s ability to maintain law and order and to continue improving respect for
human rights.  In May 1998, a judicial reform bill that had languished in parliament since late
1996 was finally passed.  Haiti took  major steps forward in its judicial reform process and
fighting police impunity in 2000.  In two major human rights cases, former Haitian soldiers
were found guilty of extrajudicial killings and given prison sentences ranging from three
years to life terms.
Over the last several years, increases in political violence renewed concerns over
security and police effectiveness.  According to the State Department’s February 2002
Human Rights Practices Report, the Haitian government “continued to commit serious
abuses during the year, and its generally poor human rights record worsened.”  In June 2001,
President Aristide announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals.
According to various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs.  The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate.  Most media outlets
practice self-censorship out of fear of retaliation.  Over 20 journalists went into exile after
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receiving death threats.  Another, Brignol Lindor, who hosted opposition speakers on his
radio talk show, was hacked to death by members of a pro-government group after a local
Lavalas Family official announced over the radio that Lindor should be met with “zero
tolerance.”
Although the investigation into the April 2000 killing of prominent radio journalist Jean
Dominique continued, the process was slowed by a lack of cooperation from police and other
officials, according to human rights reports.  An investigating judge fled the country because
of death threats.  Two key suspects have died under suspicious circumstances.  Lavalas
Family Senator and president of the Senate Commission on Public Security Dany Toussaint
is a suspect in the Dominique murder.  On January 31, the day his Senate colleagues were
to vote whether to lift Toussaint’s immunity from prosecution as a member of the legislature,
Toussaint appeared on the Senate floor accompanied by “at least a half-dozen gun-toting
men” (Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p.A14).  The Senate returned the case to the judge
prosecuting the case, rejecting his request to lift Toussaint’s immunity and asking for more
evidence linking Toussaint to the murder.
Another spate of violence occurred in December 2001, involving an attack against the
national palace and subsequent violence targeting members of the opposition.  On July 2,
2002, the OAS released a report stating that the December attack was not an attempted coup,
as the Aristide Administration had claimed.  Although the OAS did not confirm opposition
claims that the government staged the attack as a pretext for clamping down on dissent, it did
say that “[T]he political opposition did not participate in the planning or in the execution of
the  attack.”  The report also said that the government and Lavalas party officials armed
militants who plundered and burned the homes and offices of opposition members following
the palace attack.  The opposition has complained that the government is not paying all the
reparations it agreed to pay. Since late 2002, violent protests have erupted around the
country, with reports of increased calls for Aristide’s removal among Haiti’s poor, usually
considered Aristide’s core supporters.
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being
transported from South America to the United States, according to the State Department’s
March 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.  The amount of cocaine
entering the United States through Haiti decreased from about 13% of all cocaine entering
the United States to 8% in 2000.  The State Department presumed this was primarily due to
the difficulties traffickers experienced in moving drugs through Haiti because of poor
infrastructure or the seizure of drugs by rival traffickers.  Several factors make Haiti
attractive to narcotics traffickers. Located between South America and the United States, its
coasts and border with the Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent
democratic institutions and ineffectual infrastructure have been further weakened by the
political impasse that has characterized the country since 1997.  Haiti’s current legal system
is antiquated.  Haitian authorities charged with controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced,
lack sufficient resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly
susceptible to corruption.  According to the State Department’s report, “There are allegations
that high-ranking [Government of Haiti] officials in the government, judiciary, and police
are involved in or tolerate [drug] trafficking.”
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In 2001, 2002, and again on January 31, 2003, the Bush Administration said Haiti was
not certified as having fully cooperated with U.S. drug-control efforts, but it granted a vital
national interest waiver and said that aid to Haiti must continue.  According to the
Administration, the Haitian government’s commitment to counternarcotics in 2002 was “very
weak,” although it did take two important actions.  The Haitian government put into force
a bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction agreement and established an “as yet untested”
financial intelligence unit.  The Administration has said that “Haitian poverty and
hopelessness” were chief catalysts in Haitian involvement in the drug trade and in illegal
migration to the United States.  Cutting off aid to Haiti, including programs aimed at
attacking those catalysts, “would aggravate an already bad situation.”
Haitian Migration
The main elements of current immigration policy regarding Haitians are migrant
interdiction on the high seas and mandatory detentions of undocumented, interdicted
Haitians.  The Bush Administration lists “limiting the number of illegal immigrants from
Haiti” as its first national interest in Haiti (USAID Budget Justification to the Congress
FY2003).
Since 1981, U.S. policy has been for the  U.S. Coast Guard to stop and search Haitian
vessels on the high sea that are suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians.  This
policy developed as a response to a massive migration of Cuban and Haitian boat people in
1980, when about 25,000 Haitians arrived in Florida.  There was another surge of Haitian
migrants during the de facto military regime, peaking at 38,000 just after President Aristide
was overthrown in 1991, and dropping to barely1,000 after Aristide’s return in 1994.  The
number of Haitian migrants interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has remained fairly
steady since 1998, with slightly over a thousand interdictions per year for the past 5 years.
Fourteen hundred eighty-six Haitians were interdicted in FY2002.  Renewed attention has
been focused on Haitian migrants, however, since October 29, 2002, when some 220
Haitians arrived on Florida’s shores.
Some of the Congressional debate over the years has focused on whether interdicted
Haitians are economic migrants, and should therefore be returned to Haiti, or whether they
are refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution who should be allowed to stay in the
United States while applying for political asylum.  Some Members and human rights
advocates express concern that Haitians are not given the same treatment as other immigrants
seeking asylum in the United States.  (For more information see CRS Report RS21349, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.)
Legislation in the 106th Congress
P.L. 106-65 (S. 1059).   Congress agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 106-301)
for the FY2000 Department of Defense Authorization Act; the House on September 15, the
Senate on September 22.  Section 1232 prohibits DOD funding to maintain a continuous
U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000, and requires the President to notify
Congress in writing within 96 hours of any deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti after
that date. The conference report says the provision does not prohibit periodic theater
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engagement activities in Haiti under the auspices of the U.S. Southern Command.  Signed
into law on October 5, 1999.
P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194, Major Legislation).  The Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2000 included the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3422) as introduced
on November 17, 1999.  Section 520 prohibits any funding to Haiti except through regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Section 559 (1) outlines
congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive action to support the
Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and fair; developing indigenous
human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more privatization of state-owned enterprises;
a sustainable agricultural development program; and  establishing an economic development
fund to encourage U.S. investment in Haiti; (2)  requires the President to submit a report to
Congress every 6 months until September 30, 2001, regarding the status of various Haitian
government efforts in areas of concern to Congress; and (3) stipulates that not more than
17% of funds appropriated by this act for Latin America and the Caribbean may be made
available to any one country in that region.  Section 562 allows the Haitian government to
purchase defense articles and services for the civilian-led Haitian National Police and Coast
Guard, subject to regular notification procedures.  Signed into law on November 29, 1999.
P.L. 106-429 (H.R. 4811).  The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY2001
(H.R. 5526 enacted by reference.) Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except
through regular notification procedures of the Committee on Appropriations.  Section 558
prohibits aid to the Haitian government until Haiti has held free and fair elections to seat a
new parliament and is fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic
through Haiti.  Section 561 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and
services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures.  The House
Appropriations Committee’s report (H.Rept. 106-720) expressed full support of humanitarian
assistance and the private organizations through which it is provided. The Senate Committee
on Appropriations’ report (H.Rept. 106-291) states, “Absent significant political change, the
Committee believes American aid should be suspended, except for the most urgent
humanitarian programs.”  Signed into law November 6, 2000.
Legislation in the 107th Congress
P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506).  The Foreign Operations appropriations bill for FY2002.
Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except through regular notification
procedures to the Committees on Appropriations. The law contains no other conditions on
aid to Haiti. Section 554 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and
services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations. Signed into law January 10, 2002.
P.L. 107-228 (S. 1401/H.R. 1646).  The final Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2003 has no provision on Haiti.  The version passed by the House May 16, 2001 (H.R.
1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization act for FY2002 and FY2003), authorized $6,000
to the Organization of American States for each fiscal year to be appropriated only for the
investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by the
government of Haiti.  The Senate version, S. 1401, with an amendment in the nature of a
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substitute, contained no such provision, nor did the final conference version, which passed
on May 1, 2002.  Signed into law September 30, 2002.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2)
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2003.  The Commerce, Justice and State
appropriations bill makes available, in the “Federal Prison” section, an amount “not to
exceed” $20 million of contract confinement funds for the care and security in the U.S. of
Haitian (and Cuban) entrants.  Under the Foreign Operations appropriations (Division E),
Sec. 551 a) allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and services for the
Coast Guard.  Sec. 551 b) provides that “not less than” $52.5 million of funds appropriated
by Title II and to carry out AID  food aid programs  should be allocated for Haiti.  Signed
into law Feb. 20, 2003.
H.R. 643 (Waters)
Debt Cancellation for New Millennium Act.  Proposes reforms of the Enhanced Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.  Calls for full cancellation of HIPC debts to the
IMF and World Bank, and making Haiti eligible for the program.  Introduced Feb. 6; referred
to House Committee on Financial Services.
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CHRONOLOGY
02/07/01 — President Aristide is inaugurated to a second term.  The Democratic
Convergence, an opposition coalition, forms an alternative government. 
11/26/00 — Former President Aristide and his party win presidential and legislative
elections boycotted by opposition.
05/21/00 — First and second round of legislative and local elections held.  Observers
07/30/00 report fraudulent counting of votes.
12/17/99 — U.N. General Assembly creates the International Civilian Support Mission
in Haiti (MICAH) to replace U.N. peacekeeping and police-training missions
on March 15, 2000.
03/99 — President Preval appoints new prime minister and electoral council by decree.
01/99 — President Preval dissolves parliament and local governments and begins to
rule by decree.
06/09/97 — Prime Minister Smarth resigns, citing a lack of public confidence in the
government and his unwillingness to be associated with electoral fraud.
04/06/97 — Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies are marred
by low turnout and allegations of fraud by the Electoral Council.
03/26/97 — Prime Minister Rosny Smarth survives a legislative no-confidence vote.
12/05/96 — The U.N. Security council approves extension for a maximum of 8 months,
until July 31, 1997, of the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
07/17/96 — Former Army General Claude Raymond, who served during the Duvalier
dictatorship, is arrested and charged with trying to destabilize the country.
In late July 1996, two men accused of murdering Justice Minister Francois
Guy Malary in 1993 remained in prison, awaiting retrial following
expressions of outrage when they were found not guilty.
06/96 — Emmanuel Constant, the former head of the pro-military Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), who claims to have worked
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for the CIA and who fled murder charges in Haiti, is released from a U.S.
detention center in Baltimore, Maryland, while Haiti is seeking his
extradition.
06/28/96 — The U.N. Security Council approves the extension for 5 months of a
scaled-down U.N. force, called the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
06/26/96 — At a House International Relations Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott denies Republican charges that the Administration had
failed to aggressively pursue human rights abuses during the Aristide
presidency, and he indicates that the United States was working with other
nations to arrange for an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
06/5-15/96 President Preval visits Europe to promote international assistance,
investment, and an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
04/19/96 — Senator Robert Dole criticizes the Clinton Administration’s Haiti policy on
the Senate floor, and releases a critical Republican congressional staff report.
04/17/96 — The last contingent of U.S. soldiers serving as part of the UNMIH  departs
Haiti.
03/20-22/96 President Preval visits Washington, D.C., and in meetings with President
Clinton, Congress, and international financial institutions, promises to
privatize government enterprises and to adhere to international human rights
standards.
02/29/96 — The U.N. Security Council extends the UNMIH mandate, but with a force
limited to 1,200 soldiers and 300 civilian police for a period of only four
months.  Canada offers to contribute additional personnel.
02/16/96 — President Preval chooses the moderate agro-economist Rosny Smarth as
Prime Minister, and he is subsequently approved by the Haitian legislature.
02/09/96 — President Preval requests an extension of the United Nations Mission in
Haiti.
02/07/96 — President-elect Rene Preval is sworn in as President, representing the first
transition from one democratically elected president to another.
12/17/95 — In peaceful presidential elections, Rene Preval, the pro-Aristide candidate of
the Lavalas Party, wins with 89% of the vote, but turnout was only about
28% of eligible voters, and many parties boycotted the election.
